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SUMMARY
Low pathogenicity avian inﬂuenza A strains (LPAI) of the H5 and H7 type are noted for
their ability to transform into highly pathogenic counterparts (HPAI). Here we compare the
transmission characteristics in poultry of LPAI H5N2 (A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/83) and
corresponding HPAI virus by means of transmission experiments. In the experiments, ﬁve
inoculated animals are placed in a cage with ﬁve contact animals, and the infection chain is
monitored by taking blood samples, and samples from the trachea and cloaca. The data are
analysed by ﬁnal size methods and a generalized linear model. The results show that HPAI virus
is more infectious and induces a longer infectious period than LPAI. In fact, fully susceptible
animals are invariably infected when confronted with HPAI virus and die within six days after
infection. Animals previously infected with LPAI virus, on the other hand, survive an infection
with HPAI virus or escape infection all together. This implies that a previous infection with LPAI
virus eﬀectively reduces susceptibility of the host to infection and decreases transmission of HPAI
virus. We discuss the implications of these conclusions for the control and evolution of avian
inﬂuenza viruses.
INTRODUCTION
The primary reservoir of inﬂuenza A viruses is gen-
erally considered to be in wild aquatic birds of the
orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes [1]. In these
species all major subtypes of the virus can be found,
and the virus causes no or only limited mortality
[2–3]. A subset of the subtypes is found also in a var-
iety of other avian and mammalian species. In these
hosts some strains induce considerable mortality. The
close relationships between strains found in diﬀerent
species suggest that interspecies transmission events
are fairly common (e.g., [4–8]).
In poultry certain strains of inﬂuenza A are es-
pecially noted for their ability to cause high mortality.
Indeed, the term ‘fowl plague’ is colloquially used
for disease caused by these highly pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza A strains (HPAI). In Hong Kong a large
outbreak of such an HPAI strain occurred in 1997.
Besides leading to substantial economic losses, the
virus also spread to at least 18 humans. This led to the
suggestion that outbreaks of HPAI virus in poultry
could constitute a ‘pandemic threat ’ to the human
population [9].
Up to now, HPAI virus in poultry has been limited
to strains of the H5 and H7 subtype. Eighteen out-
breaks of HPAI virus have been recorded in chickens
and turkeys since 1959 [10–11]. Virulence is mainly
determined by the hemagglutinin protein (which de-
ﬁnes the H type of the strain), although there are
other determinants of virulence [12–15]. In order to
attain eﬃcient replication the hemagglutinin needs
post translational cleavage by proteases of the host.
HPAI strains have multiple basic amino acids at the
cleavage site of the hemagglutinin [16–18], making* Author for correspondence.
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cleavage by ubiquitous proteases possible and allow-
ing the virus to spread systemically and cause high
mortality.
It is known that outbreaks of HPAI virus can arise
out of outbreaks of the corresponding LPAI virus
(e.g., [11, 19]). An example is the outbreak of LPAI
in chickens in Pennsylvania in 1983. The outbreak
started in April 1983 with a low pathogenicity virus
that caused only limited mortality. In October of the
same year the virus population had transformed into
a state of high pathogenicity, causing over 80%
mortality [19–20]. The most recent example of such a
transformation event is the Italian outbreak of HPAI
H7N1 in December 1999 that had started as an out-
break of LPAI H7N1 in April of the same year [11].
In this paper we compare the transmission charac-
teristics of HPAI and LPAI virus in chickens. The
questions that arise naturally are the following. Are
animals infected with HPAI virus more infectious
than animals infected with LPAI virus? How does the
infectious period of HPAI virus compare to the in-
fectious period of LPAI virus? Are animals previously
infected with LPAI virus protected against infection
with HPAI virus? Is HPAI virus able to spread in a
population in which LPAI virus is circulating or has
circulated before? The answers to these questions are
of considerable interest since they form the basis for
an improved understanding of the selective diﬀer-
ences between LPAI and HPAI viruses and, in the
long run, for the design of rational control strategies
to minimize economic costs and the risk of inter-
species transmission.
We tackle the aforementioned questions by means
of transmission experiments. Transmission exper-
iments form an invaluable tool to study the eﬀect of
a single factor (strain type, vaccination, host genotype)
as they oﬀer a controlled setting in which confounding
variation due to other factors is kept to a minimum
[21]. In the ﬁeld of avian inﬂuenza transmission
experiments have been carried out before [22–27].
However, these previous studies were qualitative and
the conclusions were not based on a sound statistical
analysis. Here we base the analysis on a well-founded
epidemic model (the susceptible–infected–removed or
SIR model). As a consequence, all parameters have
a clear-cut biological interpretation (susceptibility,
infectiousness, infectious period), making it possible
to ascribe diﬀerences between strains or treatments to
speciﬁc, biologically interpretable parameters.
In the experiments, ﬁve intranasally and intra-
tracheally inoculated chickens were put into a cage
with ﬁve susceptible contact chickens, and the infec-
tion chain was monitored by regularly taking swabs
from the trachea and the cloaca. The swabs were
subjected to virus isolation procedures and PCR. In
addition, blood samples were taken weekly to deter-
mine blood antibody levels.
The present study consists of three sets of experi-
ments. First, we carried out four replicate experiments
with an LPAI H5N2 isolated from an outbreak in
Pennsylvania in 1983. These experiments yield in-
formation on the transmission characteristics of
the low pathogenicity strain (i.e. infectiousness, in-
fectious period, virulence). Second, two experiments
with the corresponding HPAI virus were performed
to determine the strain characteristics of HPAI
H5N2 and, more importantly, to compare the LPAI
and HPAI strains. Finally, we performed two ex-
periments with HPAI H5N2, taking animals that
previously had been infected with LPAI virus as
contact animals to obtain insight in the impact of
previous infection on the transmission of HPAI
virus.
METHODS
Materials and experimental setup
All animal experiments were undertaken in a high
containment unit under BSL3+ conditions at the
Central Institute for Animal Disease Control. The
experiments comply with the Dutch law on animal
experiments and were reviewed by an ethical com-
mittee.
Viruses
Two avian H5N2 strains were used, a low pathogen-
icity strain isolated from the index case in April
1983 (A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/21525/83), and a
high pathogenicity strain isolated in October 1983
(A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/83). Both strains were
sent from the USDA (Ames, Iowa) to our laboratory
in 1984. The strains were grown in allantoic ﬂuid and
stored at x70 xC. We performed a standard intra-
venous pathogenicity test with both strains. The
intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of the LPAI
strain was 0.0 implying low pathogenicity, while the
IVPI of the HPAI strain was 2.0 implying high
pathogenicity. We checked for mutations in the
hemagglutinin gene by sequencing the cleavage and
glycosylation sites. No diﬀerences were found with
published sequences [28–29].
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Animals
Six week old speciﬁed pathogen free White Leghorn
chickens were used. The animals were housed in
cages. In each cage ﬁve chickens were inoculated at
day 0. After 24 h, ﬁve susceptible contact animals
were added. During the ﬁrst 7 days post infection
tracheal and cloacal swabs were taken every day.
From day 7 onwards swabs were taken twice a week.
Blood samples were taken once a week.
Experimental procedures
Inoculation route and dose
Animals were inoculated both intranasally and intra-
tracheally with 0.1 ml diluted allantoic ﬂuid contain-
ing 106 EID50 per ml.
Virus isolation and serology
Swabs were put in 2 ml 2.95% tryptose phosphate
buﬀer with 5r103 IU of penicillin–sodium and 5 mg
streptomycin per ml. The swabs were stored at
x70 xC until analysed. Three embryonated chicken
eggs incubated for 9 days were injected with 0.2 ml of
the solution per egg. The eggs were then incubated
for another 72 h. A standard hemagglutination assay
was carried out on the allantoic ﬂuid of the eggs.
The Hemagglutinin Inhibition (HI) test on the sera
was done by standard methods.
RNA isolation and PCR
RNA isolation and reverse transcriptase PCR were
done as described in [30].
Statistical analyses
Final size analysis
In ﬁrst instance, the analysis of the experiments is
based on the ﬁnal size of the experiments, i.e. the
number of contact animals that have been infected
when the infection chain has ended. The ﬁnal sizes are
used to obtain estimates of the (basic) reproduction
ratio, i.e. the number of infections that would be
caused by a single infected individual in a large
population of susceptibles. A forte of ﬁnal size meth-
ods is that they are robust (e.g., inclusion of a latent
period does not alter the results) and that diﬀerent
assumptions on the distribution of the infectious per-
iod are easily incorporated.
The methods are based on maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE). That it is possible to use MLE
hinges on the fact that ﬁnal size distributions can be
determined under a wide range of assumptions [31].
We focus on two extreme scenarios, one in which the
infectious period is exponentially distributed, and
one in which the infectious period is of ﬁxed duration.
The estimator of the reproduction ratio is labelled by
RMLE1 in case of the ﬁrst scenario, and by RMLE2 in
case of the second scenario.
For the ﬁrst two sets of experiments the analyses
are based on virus isolation as well as on serology. In
case of virus isolation an animal is marked as infected
if it is positive in either the tracheal or cloacal swab
on at least one day. In case of serology, an animal is
marked as positive if it has an HI titre or if it has died
from the infection. For the third set of experiments no
analysis is carried out on the serological data because
all contact animals already had a high titre from a
previous infection.
Generalized Linear Modelling
Although ﬁnal size methods are ﬂexible, they do not
make use of all the available information. To take
the time course of the experimental epidemics into
account, we estimate the transmission parameter b of
the stochastic SIR model by means of a Generalized
Linear Model [32–33].
To this end the data in Figures 1–3 are ﬁrst rend-
ered into the format (S, i, C ). Here S is the number
of susceptible animals in a certain time period, i is
the prevalence of infection (i.e. the average number
of infectious animals divided by the total number of
animals), and C represents the number of new infec-
tions that have appeared at the end of the time period.
By standard reasoning we assume that the number of
cases C arising in a day is binomially distributed with
parameter pinf=1xexbi (the probability of infection)
and binomial totals S :
CyBin(S, 1xexbi): (1)
Notice that the above model entails the following as-
sumptions: (i) all susceptible birds are equally sus-
ceptible ; (ii ) all infected birds are equally infectious;
and (iii ) each infected bird poses an independent risk
of infection to each susceptible bird. These assump-
tions can be relaxed, but this seems wise only if the ﬁt
of the model is unsatisfactory or if a large amount of
data is available.
In the model (1), log(b ) is estimated using a
complementary log–log link function while taking
log(i) as oﬀset variable. The ﬁt of the model is
checked by inspection of the (residual) deviance that,
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Fig. 1. Summary of the LPAI transmission experiments (A/chicken/Pennsylvania/83 H5N2). Four replicate experiments
are carried out. In each experiment ﬁve chickens are inoculated at day 0 (I). From day 1 onwards ﬁve contact animals (S) are
placed in the cage with the inoculated chickens, and the infection chain is monitored. The data X/Y/Z represent the
following : X/Y/Z=egg culture trachea/PCR trachea/egg culture cloaca. An animal is marked positive in the serology if
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under standard assumptions ([32], p. 118), is approxi-
mately x2-distributed. The analyses are carried out in
GenStat 5.4.
The infectious periods are directly observed. Hence,
estimation of the infectious periods and correspond-
ing conﬁdence intervals is straightforward.
The estimate of the reproduction ratio is given by
the product of the estimates of the transmission par-
ameter and infectious period: R^=b^c^. Construction
of the corresponding conﬁdence intervals is based
on the identity Var ( bc)=(Ec)2Var b+Eb2Var c [34].
Insertion of the estimated means and variances of b
and c into this formula yields an estimate for the
variance of R, thereby allowing the construction of
conﬁdence intervals. Notice that as the model yields
estimates of log(b ) we need to take into account that
(asymptotically) the estimator of b is lognormally
distributed.
RESULTS
The transmission characteristics of LPAI virus
Figure 1 summarizes the four replicate transmission
experiments with LPAI virus (Experiments 1–4). The
estimates of the reproduction ratio R, based on the
ﬁnal size analyses, are given in Table 1. If we take
virus isolation as indicative of infection, R is esti-
mated at 1.1. If, on the other hand, we take serology
as an indicator of infection (so that we regard the
positives in the virus isolation that are negative in
the serological analysis as superﬁcial infections that
cannot spread further), R is estimated at 0.6. The
limits of the conﬁdence intervals of the reproduction
ratio range from 0.2 to 2.4, and we cannot make
statements as to whether R>1 or R<1.
Table 2 shows the analyses based on the time course
of Experiments 1–4. It appears that our inoculation
route and dose resulted in a reliable infection (see
Figs 1–3). In fact, in Experiments 1–4 most of the
inoculated animals were marked as positive (and
hence as infectious) for 5 days, while the remainder
of the inoculated animals were positive for 4 days.
The mean of the infectious period of the inoculated
animals is 4.8 days with a coeﬃcient of variation (CV)
of just 9%.
The mean of the infectious period of the contact
infected animals is comparable to the infectious peri-
od of the inoculated animals (4.3 days vs. 4.8 days).
However, variation in the infectious period is con-
siderably higher for the contact infected animals than
for the inoculated animals (CV=55% for contact
infections vs. CV=9% for inoculated animals ;
F(9, 19)=27.9, P<0.001). This indicates that contact
infections are more variable than artiﬁcially induced
infections.
The infectiousness of infected animals is deter-
mined by the transmission parameter b. Loosely
Table 1. Estimates of the reproduction ratio, based on the ﬁnal size of the experimental epidemics. The three
sets of experiments are described in the main text. The ﬁnal size analyses are based on virus isolation for all three
sets of experiments, and on serology for the ﬁrst two sets of experiments (see Figs 1–3). RMLE1 is the maximum
likelihood estimator of R if the infectious period is exponentially distributed, while RMLE2 is the maximum
likelihood estimator of R if the infectious period is of ﬁxed duration. 95% conﬁdence intervals are given
between brackets
Experiments
Virus isolation Serology
Number
infected RMLE1 RMLE2
Number
infected RMLE1 RMLE2
1–4 (LPAI) 0, 2, 3, 5 1.17 (0.47–2.39) 1.06 (0.47–1.89) 0, 0, 3, 3 0.62 (0.20–1.52) 0.59 (0.21–1.27)
5–6 (HPAI) 5, 5 1 (1.30–1) 1 (1.33–1) 5, 5 1 (1.30–1) 1 (1.33–1)
7–8 (HPAI;
contact animals
with titre)
1, 3 0.79 (0.20–2.68) 0.78 (0.21–2.02) NA NA NA
it is positive in one of the samples (taken at day 7, 14, 21, and also at day 28 in Experiments 1 and 2). Maximum 2 log HI titres
are given between brackets. x : the sample was not analysed. 1 Cloacal swabs were also negative after second passage in
embryonated chicken eggs. 2 No virus was isolated when tested at day 14. 3 The animal was marked as positive only after
retesting.
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speaking, b represents the number of susceptible
animals that would be infected in one day by a single
infected animal in a large population of susceptible
animals. If the cases arising at the end of a certain
time period are assumed to have been infected in the
time period under consideration (i.e. the latent period
is at most one day), b is estimated at 0.22 (dayx1). The
deviance is 32.5 (df=25), so that there is no reason
to suspect the ﬁt of the model. We also considered a
model with a latent period of one to two days (i.e.
the new cases arising at the end of a time period had
actually been infected at the beginning of the time
period). For this model b is estimated at 0.24 (dayx1)
with deviance of 24.9 (df=22), also suggesting a sat-
isfactory ﬁt of the model.
The estimate of the reproduction ratio is given by
the products of the estimates of b and c. For the LPAI
experiments the reproduction ratio is estimated at
0.95 or at 1.00. The conﬁdence intervals as determined
with the methods described in the Materials and
Methods section range from 0.0 to 2.4.
The transmission characteristics of HPAI virus
Figure 2 shows the results of the two replicate ex-
periments with HPAI virus using susceptible contact
animals (Experiments 5–6). Tables 1 and 2 present
the outcome of the analyses. The mean infectious
period of the 10 infected contact animals is 6.8 days
(95% CI=(4.91; 8.69)).
Estimation of the transmission parameter is based
on the GLM described in the Materials and Methods
section. If the latent period is at most one day, b^ is 0.8
(dayx1) (95% CI=(0.4; 1.5)). However, the deviance
of the model is high (23.6 with df=4), implying
that the model does not ﬁt the data well. If, on the
other hand, the latent period is assumed to be between
one and two days, b^ is increased more than ﬁvefold
( b^=4.7 (dayx1)), while the deviance is considerably
lower (1.5 with df=2). This implies the model with a
latent period of one to two days ﬁts the data better
than the model with a latent period of at most one day.
If we take the lower bounds of both the conﬁdence
intervals of b and c as indicative of the lower bound
of R, we arrive at a value of 0.42r4.91=2.1. Since
this is considerably higher than 1 we conclude that
the reproduction ratio of HPAI virus is higher than 1.
Comparison of the transmission characteristics of
LPAI and HPAI virus
Let us ﬁrst compare the excretion patterns of LPAI
and HPAI virus in the trachea and cloaca. As Figure 1
shows (Experiments 1 and 2), LPAI virus is only
found once in the cloaca of the 60 positives in the
trachea. Hence, we may conclude that an infection
with LPAI virus does only sporadically lead to ap-
preciable virus shedding in the gastro-intestinal tract.
The picture is quite diﬀerent for infections with HPAI
virus, which does occur in high frequency in the
cloaca (Fig. 2). In the majority of cases, the cloacal
swabs are positive if the tracheal swabs are positive.
There are some exceptions to this rule, most notably
on the ﬁrst day of infection.
Table 2. Estimation of the reproduction ratio, based on the time course of the experimental epidemics (see Figs 1–3).
The records (S, i, C) represent the number of susceptibles, the prevalence of infection, and the number of new
cases. Estimates of the infectious period c are based on the observed contact infections. The transmission parameter
b of the stochastic SIR epidemic is estimated with a Generalized Linear Model. 95% conﬁdence intervals are
given between brackets. Not all conﬁdence intervals are calculated because of the limited number of data
Experiments
Number of
contact
infections
Infectious period
c^ (day)
Number of
records (S, i, C)
Transmission
parameter
b^ (dayx1)
Reproduction
ratio R^=b^c
1–4 (LPAI) 10 4.25 (2.57–5.93) 261 0.221 (0.12–0.42) 0.951 (0.00–2.29)
232 0.242 (0.12–0.45) 1.002 (0.00–2.42)
5–6 (HPAI) 10 6.80 (4.91–8.69) 51 0.781 (0.42–1.47) 5.301
32 4.662 (2.09–10.36) 31.72
7–8 (HPAI; 4 1.00 131 0.171 (0.07–0.47) 0.171
contact animals
with titre)
112 0.242 (0.08–0.69) 0.242
1 The latent period is at most one day.
2 The latent period is between one and two days.
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Let us now compare the LPAI and HPAI exper-
iments on a more quantitative basis. A comparison of
the infectious period of the LPAI contact infected
animals with the HPAI contact infected animals
shows that there is evidence that the infectious period
in HPAI contact infected animals is signiﬁcantly
longer than the infectious period of LPAI contact
infected animals (t=2.28, df=18, P<0.05). Hence,
the fact that HPAI eﬃciently exploits the host and
that 9 out of 10 HPAI contact infected animals die
within two weeks after infection in eﬀect does not
reduce the infectious period.
In addition, there is evidence that transmission
parameter of HPAI virus is higher than that of LPAI
virus. This is true if we assume that the period of
latency is at most one day and compare the trans-
mission parameters of LPAI virus and HPAI virus
(tk=3.48, dfB6, P<0.05; [35]), or if we assume that
the latent period is between one and two days
(tk=3.07, dfB4, P<0.05).
Summarizing, both the infectious period and trans-
mission parameter of HPAI virus exceed the infec-
tious period and transmission parameter of LPAI
virus. Hence, we conclude that the reproduction ratio
of HPAI virus is higher than the reproduction ratio of
LPAI virus.
Prior infection with LPAI virus provides eﬀective
protection against HPAI virus
Inspection of Figures 2 and 3 indicates that there are
considerable diﬀerences between Experiments 5 and 6
where fully susceptible contact animals were used,
and Experiments 7 and 8 where the contact animals
had been infected before. Two features are note-
worthy. First, only 4 of the contact animals are in-
fected in Experiments 7 and 8, while all 10 contact
animals are infected in Experiments 5 and 6. Second,
none of the four infected contact animals die in Ex-
periments 7 and 8, while 9 out of 10 infected contact
Fig. 2. Summary of the HPAI experiments (A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/83 H5N2). Two replicate experiments using fully sus-
ceptible contact animals (S) are carried out. The data X/Y represent the following: X/Y=egg culture trachea/egg culture
cloaca. # indicates that the animal died. Note that all susceptible contact animals were infected, and that only one of the
infected animals survived the infection.
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animals die in Experiments 5 and 6. Formal tests
corroborate these ﬁndings: the infectious period,
transmission rate, and pathogen induced host mor-
tality are higher in Experiments 7 and 8 than in Ex-
periments 5 and 6. We conclude that an infection with
LPAI provides eﬀective protection against infection
and mortality caused by HPAI virus.
DISCUSSION
The transmission characteristics of LPAI and
HPAI virus
We have shown, on the basis of an epidemic model,
that fully susceptible birds infected with HPAI virus
are more infectious than birds infected with LPAI
virus, and that the infectious period induced by the
HPAI virus is longer than the infectious period in-
duced by LPAI virus. The latter ﬁnding is somewhat
surprising as one could have argued that the fact that
HPAI eﬃciently exploits the host and causes rapid
death (within 4–10 days) would in eﬀect result in a
reduction of the infectious period.
Second, the transmission of HPAI virus is strongly
reduced in a population where all animals previously
went through an infection with LPAI virus. This
can be taken as a prima facie evidence that in the ﬁeld
a primary infection with LPAI virus will eﬀectively
protect against a secondary infection with HPAI
virus.
Third, birds infected by contact with HPAI virus
shed virus in the trachea as well as in the cloaca, while
birds infected by contact with LPAI virus shed virus
in the trachea only (see also [19]). It is tempting to
speculate that the observed diﬀerences in the trans-
mission characteristics of LPAI virus and HPAI virus
are a consequence of diﬀerences in excretion patterns
of these particular LPAI and HPAI strains. To what
extent these results hold for other combinations of
low and high pathogenicity viruses (e.g., Mexico 1995
Fig. 3. Summary of the HPAI H5N2 experiments with contact animals that have a titre against LPAI H5N2 (denoted by S*).
Two replicate experiments are carried out. The data X/Y represent the following: X/Y=egg culture trachea/egg culture
cloaca. # indicates that the animal died. Note that only four contact animals became infected. All four infected contact
animals survived the infection. 1 2 log HI titre at day 0.
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(H5N2) or Italy 1999 (H7N1)) is still an open
question.
The value and limitations of experimental
transmission studies
A forte of experimental transmission studies is that it
is relatively easy to control for unwanted confounders,
so that diﬀerences between treatment groups can
directly be ascribed to diﬀerences in treatments. On
the downside, results of transmission experiments are
in principle not easily extrapolated to the situation in
the ﬁeld. In fact, in the ﬁeld there are numerous
confounding variables that may aﬀect the trans-
mission chain (breed used, age of the animals, con-
current infections, stocking density, immunological
status, ambient temperature, feed status, etc.). Hence,
transmission studies are well suited to make com-
parisons between treatments, but care should be taken
in extrapolation of the parameter estimates unless
the experimental conditions closely match the real-life
situation.
Nevertheless, in our opinion experimental trans-
mission form an indispensable tool not only to test
for diﬀerences between treatment groups, but also to
obtain baseline estimates of epidemiologically rel-
evant parameters. Ideally, transmission experiments
such as described here are complemented by an as-
sessment of the situation in the ﬁeld (e.g., by carrying
out a population study) thereby making it possible
to extrapolate the results from the transmission
experiments to the ﬁeld situation, and to interpret
the results from population studies in terms of
relevant mechanisms (strain type, breed, stocking
density, etc.).
Implications for the transmission dynamics of
inﬂuenza A
The main value of the reproduction ratio is that
it combines diﬀerent aspects of the host–pathogen
interaction into a single summary parameter that
gives insight in the transmission dynamics of the
pathogen. Consider, for instance, the following ques-
tion. How many animals should have had an infection
with LPAI virus to prevent an outbreak of HPAI
virus? In the SIR model the critical fraction of the
population that needs to be immune to obtain herd
immunity, pc, is related to the reproduction ratio
RHPAI through pc=1x1/RHPAI [36]. Assuming that
our estimates of the reproduction ratio of HPAI
virus (e.g., RˆHPAI=31.7; Table 2) are indicative of
the reproduction ratio in the ﬁeld, this implies that
the critical fraction of animals that need to be infected
previously with LPAI virus to prevent an outbreak of
HPAI virus is 1x1/31.7=0.97.
In view of the large diﬀerences in the reproduction
ratios of LPAI and HPAI virus it is unlikely that the
critical infection fraction will be reached in the ﬁeld.
In fact, the fraction of susceptibles S* that is left at
the end of a major outbreak of LPAI virus is related
to the reproduction ratio RLPAI through a ‘ﬁnal size
equation’ (e.g., lnS*=xRLPAI(1xS*) in case of an
exponentially distributed infectious period [31]). Our
estimates of the reproduction ratio of LPAI do not
exceed 2.39 (Table 1), implying that at most 88% of
the individuals will have protective immunity after an
outbreak. This is considerably lower than the required
97% to prevent an outbreak of HPAI. The practical
implication is that a major outbreak of LPAI virus
is unlikely to provide herd immunity against a major
outbreak of HPAI virus.
Evolution of avian inﬂuenza A viruses
Why do low pathogenicity inﬂuenza A strains in
poultry that are quite capable to transform into highly
pathogenic counterparts prevail in the ﬁeld, and how
can this fact be reconciled with the apparent selective
advantage of highly pathogenic strains over strains
of low pathogenicity? An intuitive explanation states
that ‘ the main goal of parasitic microbes is not to
multiply in their host as much as possible, but to
ensure that they can still do so after years, decades,
or even centuries ’ ([37], p. 218). Other authors have
expressed similar ideas (e.g., [1, 7]). The argument,
however, does not stand scrutiny as it invokes a group
selectionist argument that is known to be ﬂawed
[38]. In fact, the argument suggests that outbreaks of
HPAI are artifacts that are a consequence of the virus
not yet being well adapted to its host. It may even give
a false sense of security as it suggests that, given
enough time, the pathogen population will eventually
evolve so as to minimize the damaged inﬂicted upon
the host.
In theory, one may still rescue the argument that
the pathogen population will evolve to be able to
persist on the longer time scale [39]. The conditions
under which this may happen are, however, restric-
tive. First, it requires that the number of lineages that
have become extinct because of overexploitation of
the host is large, and second, the time scale on which
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the phenomenon could be eﬀective is very long. It is
therefore unlikely that selection has moulded inﬂu-
enza strains of poultry to a state where they exploit
the host prudently. In fact, it is questionable whether
such a state will ever be reached as highly pathogenic
H5 and H7 viruses do not form unique lineages but
share a recent common ancestor with nonpathogenic
H5 and H7 viruses [3, 40], and as interspecies trans-
mission events are common [7, 41]. In view of the
above reasoning it remains enigmatic why we do not
observe outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian inﬂu-
enza A more often.
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